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Private Instream Rights: Western Water Oasis or Mirage?
An Examination Of The Legal And Practical Impediments To Private
Instream Rights In Alaska
George A. Kimbreil*
"The law is a mechanism for getting things done, for accomplishing the
purposes of society, for requiring some things and forbidding others. If the
people of the United States or of a state desire to keep water in a stream or
to put it back in a stream, a law can be framed that will do that job."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The nineteenth century settlement of the arid American West created a
doctrine that rewarded hasty diversion and "beneficial" water use: prior
appropriation.2 The result was the exploitation of water resources in the
quest for economic, agricultural, and industrial development. 3 During the
last twenty-five years, prior appropriation states slowly became aware that
traditional water distribution mechanisms do not adequately protect against
over-appropriation.4 Fish and wildlife depend on flows of water to survive.
For example, salmon need timely flows of cold, clean water to migrate to
and from the ocean. Continuous development and diversions over the past
150 years have depleted flows in many places to the point of exhaustion.
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I. Frank J. Trelease, The Legal Bases for Instream Flows, 2 Am. Fisheries Socy. Instream Flow
Needs, 1-21 (1976).
2. See generally Waters and Water Rights, vol. 2, §§ 11-12 (Robert E. Beck, ed., Michie 1991);
Steven J. Shupe & Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Recognizing the Value of In-place Uses of Water in the
West: An Introduction to the Laws, Strategies, and Issues, in Instream Flow Protection in the West I -
(Lawrence J. Macdonnell et. al. eds., U. of Colo. Sch. of L. Nat. Resources L. Ctr. 1993); Brian Morris,
When Rivers Run Dry under a Big Sky: Balancing Agricultural and Recreational Claims to Scarce
Water Resources in America and the American West, I I Stan. Envtl. L.J. 259, 260 (1992); Janet Neu-
man, Implementing Instream Flow Protections in Prior Appropriation Systems: Continuing Challenges,
in Rivers vol. 7, 345 (2000).
3. A 1933 quote from a U.S. senator is a perfect synopsis of the prevailing philosophy: "It is
emblematic of the dawning of that day when every rippling steam that flows down the mountain side
and winds its way through the meadows to the sea shall be harnessed and made to work for the welfare
and comfort of man." David M. Gillilan & Thomas C. Brown, Instream Flow Protection: Seeking a
Balance in Western Water Use 34 (Island Press 1997) (quoting former Tennessee Senator George Nor-
ris).
4. Barton H. Thompson Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 Win. & Mary Envtl. L. & Policy Rev. 261,
268-269 (2000) (noting that the "prior appropriation doctrine ... promoted the very depletion of the
West's rivers that is now a source of serious environmental concern").
5. For a pertinent example of how human development has almost eviscerated the Pacific North-
west wild salmon, see Michael C. Blumm, Sacrificing the Salmon: A Legal and Policy History of the
Decline of Columbia Basin Salmon (BookWorld Publications 2002) (describing the impact of altered
stream flows on salmon in the Pacific Northwest); see generally Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The
American West and Its Disappearing Water (Viking Press 1986); Tom Annear et al., Instream Flows for
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In response to changing public values and increased biological and hy-
drological awareness in the last quarter of the twentieth century, state legis-
latures, agencies, and interested parties tried numerous methods to protect
instream flows. 6 Early efforts included "wild and scenic" river laws, 7 condi-
tioning consumptive water rights for instream flows, 8 or creating statutory
minimum flow levels.9 Other efforts include application of the waste ° and
public trust doctrines," federal reserved rights, 2 tribal rights,' 3 federal en-
vironmental statutes, 4 leasing instream rights, 5 and acquisition of instream
rights by state agencies. 16 Every effort in this smorgasbord of legislative,
judicial, and administrative solutions has two common denominators: first,
each is public, involuntary, and/or regulatory in nature; second, each has
failed to adequately protect instream flows. Since the beginning of the
modern instream "awakening," however, some observers have heralded the
use of another, different method to protect instream flows: privately held
instream rights.'
7
Riverine Resource Stewardship (Instream Flow Council 2002) (noting that "competing uses have re-
sulted in degraded river ecosystems in every region of the United states and Canada"); Donald Worster,
Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West (Pantheon Books 1985); Barton
H. Thompson Jr., Water Allocation and Protection: A United States Case Study, in Earth Systems:
Processes and Issues 476, 479 (W.G. Ernst ed., Cambridge U. Press 2000) (noting that river depletion
has led to the extinction of some fish species and serious population declines in other species of fish and
wildlife). For an excellent discussion of the effects of stream depletion in California and an argument for
preservation of instream flow there, see Gregory A. Thomas, Conserving Aquatic Biodiversity: A Criti-
cal Comparison of the Legal Tools for Augmenting Streamflows in California, 15 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3, 5-
12(1996).
6. For a general discussion of various in-stream flow protection devices tried by states, see
Gillilan & Brown, supra n. 3; for a survey of western state instream flow programs, see Cynthia F.
Covell, A Survey of State Instream Flow Programs in the Western United States, I U. Denv. Water L.
Rev., 177, 180 (1998).
7. Jack Sterne, Instream Rights & Invisible Hands: Prospects for Private Instream Water Rights
ini the Northwest, 27 Envtl. L. 203, 212-213 (1997) (discussing Oregon's 1915 efforts to protect the
waterfalls of the Columbia Gorge).
8. Cal. Water Code Ann. §§ 1257.5, 1253 (West Supp. 1993); Brian E. Gray, A Reconsideration
of Instream Appropriative Water Rights in California, 16 Ecology L. Q. 667 (1989).
9. Examples include 1955 Or. Laws 707; Wash. Rev. Code § 75 (1963 and Supp. 1993).
10. Karen Russell, Wasting Water in the Northwest: Eliminating Waste as a Way of Restoring
Stream Flows, 27 Envt. L. 151 (1997).
1I. Richard Ausness, Water Rights, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream
Uses, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 407 (1987); see also Michael C. Blumm, & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and
the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 701,727-33 (1995).
12. Water and Water Rights, supra n. 2 at § 37; Winters v. U.S., 207 U.S. 564 (1908); Gillilan &
Brown, supra n. 3, at 177-223.
13. Gillilan & Brown, supra n. 3, at 193-197.
14. See e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, The Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights, 20 Land &
Water L. Rev. 1 (1985); Thompson, supra n. 5, at 479; see generally Gillilan & Brown, supra n. 3, at
255-296.
15. See James D. Crammond, Leasing Water Rights for Instream Flow Uses: A Survey of Water
Transfer Policies, Practices and Problems in the Pacific Northwest, 26 Envtl. L. 225 (1996); see also
Holly Franz, Montana's Instream Flow Experience: Past, Present, and Future, 7 Rivers 245 (2000).
16. See generally Covell, supra n. 6.
17. Many authors have advocated for the creation of private water markets and as part of such, the
ability to privately hold instream rights. See James Huffman, Instream Water Use: Public and Private
Alternatives, in Water Rights: Scarce Resource Allocation, Bureaucracy, and the Environment 273-280
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Conceptually, private instream rights are just what they sound like: a
vested usufructuary property right of a private individual or organization,
held instream for purposes of beneficial use. Proponents argue that the sup-
plementation of public rights18 with privately held rights offers more effec-
tive solutions to protecting stream flows because private participation
would eliminate the financial, enforcement, and bureaucratic deficiencies of
agency-only systems through market mechanisms.19 They maintain that the
constraint on ownership of instream rights is directly opposed to one of the
basic principles of prior appropriation: water should be available to anyone
who puts it to "beneficial use" without waste.2°
In response, western states have in large part balked at permitting pri-
vately held instream flows.2' The state legislatures' objections ranged from
the philosophical (the unique public nature of water instream) to the eco-
nomic (speculation concerns) to the political (agricultural interests).22 As a
result, the debate over the effectiveness of private instream rights has re-
mained theoretical.
Alaska, however, is an anomaly in the American West: it has yet to de-
velop to the detriment of its riverine systems and instream flows. Alaska
was also the first state to statutorily create private instream rights. This
(Terry Anderson ed., Ballinger Pub. Co. 1983); Clay J. Landry, Saving Our Streams Through Water
Markets: A Practical Guide (PERC 1998); Terry L. Anderson & Pamela Snyder, Water Markets: Prim-
ing the Invisible Pump (Cato Inst. 1997); John Leshy, Instream Flow Rights: The Private and Public
Roles, 616 ALI-ABA 163, 172 (1991); Steme, supra n. 7; Thomas, supra n. 5; but cf generally Michael
C. Blumm, The Fallacies of Free Market Environmentalism, 15 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 371 (1992)
(arguing that markets and private ownership are not always the answer to resource problems); Joe Del-
lapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right: The Myth of Markets for Water, 25 Win. & Mary
Envtl. L. & Policy Rev. 317 (2000); Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Rights and the Common Wealth, 26 Envtl.
L. 27 (1996).
18. A public or publicly held instream fight is a water right held by a state agency or by the state in
trust. David Getches, Water Law in a Nutshell 96 (West 1997). For the purposes of this paper, "publicly
held" and "agency held" will be used interchangeably.
19. Steme, supra n. 7, at 205.
20. Christopher Meyer, Instream Flows: Integrating New Uses and New Players into the Prior
Appropriation System, in Instream Flow Protection in the West 2-13 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell &
Teresa A. Rice, eds., Univ. of Colo. Sch. of L. Nat. Resources L. Ctr. 1993).
21. See generally Covell, supra n. 6; see also Sterne, supra n. 7, at 204. For an enlightening exam-
ple of the narrow interpretation of a state statute as to not permit private holding of instream fights and
how it fundamentally altered the mission of a trail-blazing organization, see Janet Neuman & Cheyenne
Chapman, Wading into the Water Market: The First Five Years of the Oregon Water Trust, 14 J. Envtl.
L & Lit. 135 (1999).
22. Thompson, supra n. 4, at 288; Neuman & Chapman, supra n. 21, at 170-17; Meyer, supra n.
20, at 2-13.
23. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.145 (LEXIS 2001); A. Dan Tarlock, Future Issues in Instream Flow
Protection in the West, in Instream Flow Protection in the West 8-13 (Lawrence J. Macdonnell & Teresa
A. Rice, eds., Univ. of Colo. Sch. of L. Nat. Resources L. Ctr. 1993). Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, Ore-
gon, Utah, Colorado, and Wyoming permit only state agencies to hold instream rights. Joseph Sax et al.,
Legal Control Of Water Resources 114 (3rd ed., West 2000). Alaska, Arizona, Nevada, California, and
New Mexico all provide some opportunity for private parties to hold instream rights. Neuman, supra n.
2, at 346. Arizona has interpreted "beneficial use" to include instream uses and therefore approved of
private instream rights. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-141A (West 1998); see also McClellan v.
Jantzen, 547 P.2d 494 (1976) (holding that since the state legislature added instream uses to the statu-
tory list of beneficial uses, a diversion is not necessary to receive a water right under state law). For
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statutory right-coupled with Alaska's legal and developmental infancy,
lack of appropriative pressure on water, and focus on natural resources-
creates a seemingly ideal situation for effective instream flow protection
through a private instream flow market.24 But instead, a combination of
factors has discouraged and frustrated attempts at private instream flow
protection in Alaska.25 This paper examines private instream water right
opportunities and problems in Alaska, and their implications on effectuating
private instream rights elsewhere.
The paper begins, in section II, with a comparative analysis of the ideo-
logical and practical arguments for publicly held versus privately held in-
stream water rights. Section III provides a background of water issues and
water law in Alaska. Section IV examines the Alaska 1980 instream flow
statute and its results. Section V dissects the inherent statutory weaknesses
that made instream rights in Alaska inferior to consumptive water rights,
and sabotaged any chance for effective instream flow protection. Section VI
revisits the arguments for private instream rights in light of Alaska's ex-
perience and suggests lessons to be learned, concluding that private in-
stream rights still hold promise for instream advocates. However, Alaska's
experience illustrates some crucial practical limitations to consider (espe-
cially the need for state agency cooperation and support) and legal pitfalls
to avoid (specifically, provisions that make instream rights inferior to con-
sumptive rights) if this instream water oasis is not to become a mere mi-
rage.
II. PUBLIC V. PRIVATE
There has been a philosophical debate 26 over the nature and ownership of
instream flow rights in prior appropriation water law since such rights were
first proposed.27  Instream water rights28 are arguably vested property
further discussion of the similarities between the problems acquiring private instream flows in Arizona
and in Alaska, see infra n. 174. Nevada also has implicitly recognized the legal legitimacy of private
instream flows through administrative channels. Gillilan & Brown, supra n. 3, at 116. In California and
New Mexico private parties can hold instream rights but only if they are transferred or dedicated from
existing consumptive uses. Neuman, supra n. 2, at 346. Montana allows for private leasing, but not
permanent ownership, for instream purposes. Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-408 (1999).
24. Alaska has been called "the greatest opportunity for private citizen involvement in an instream
flow program." Covell, supra n. 6, at 193; Nina Burkardt, Paradise Confounded: The Status of Alaska
Instream Flow Program, 7 Rivers 361 (2000).
25. Christopher Estes, Annual Summary of Instream Flow Reservations and Protections in Alaska,
in Fishery Data Series No. 96-45 10-14 (Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game 1996).
26. See supra, n. 17 and accompanying text.
27. The first hurdle for instream flow rights in prior appropriation states was the requirement for
diversion. Virtually all states which have instream flow rights have either legislatively or judicially
altered their codes to allow for beneficial use without diversion. Meyer, supra n. 20, at 2-1, 2-2; A. Dan
Tarlock, Appropriation for Instream Flow Maintenance: A Progress Report on New Public Western
Water Rights, 1978 Utah L. Rev. 211, 221 (1978) (foreseeing that "actual diversion requirement serves
no function that cannot be served by other water law doctrines... instream uses should be valid
and...presumed beneficial"). For an argument that prior appropriation's distinguishing feature is it's
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rights29 and therefore may be a more permanent method of protecting flows
than any type of regulation. 30 The majority of western states have chosen to
permit only publicly held instream rights.31
A. The Rationale behind Publicly Held Instream Rights
Numerous arguments have been made that ownership of instream rights
must be limited solely to state agencies. The first argument is philosophical:
flowing water is by its nature the quintessential "public good. 32 Water in-
stream provides public benefits-aesthetics, water quality, recreation, fish
and wildlife protection-that, according to some, are not properly con-
trolled by private parties.33 It therefore is logical such rights, in contrast
with consumptive, diversionary uses which grant exclusive benefits, be held
solely by public agencies.34 The economic corollary is that public goods
like water are frequently under-produced by markets because of difficulty
measuring their worth, and the "free rider" problem. 35 These problems are
endemic to public goods such as schools, fire and police protection, roads,
and parks, thus frequently necessitating control by the public sector. Free-
flowing water falls in this category and therefore the argument follows that
it is better controlled by public agencies.36
adaptability in the face of changing western values, see A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropria-
tion in the New West, 41 Nat. Resources J. 769 (2001).
28. An instream appropriative water right is defined as "an amount of water to be allowed to flow
through a stretch of stream in order to protect fish and wildlife, scenic beauty or water-borne recrea-
tion." Getches, supra n. 18, at 75.
29. In Alaska and Colorado, for example, a water right is a property right. Owischeck v. Guide
Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 493 (Alaska 1988); Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d
1374, 1377 (Colo. 1982). A water right in most prior appropriation states is a right to use beneficially
but not wholly exclude, a usufructory right as opposed to a possessory right. Getches, supra n. 18, at
75.
30. Gillilan & Brown, supra n. 3, at 144. See argument infra 1(C) for advantages of property rights
over regulation.
31. See supra n. 23.
32. Dellapenna, supra n. 17, at 329 (arguing that water markets for privately held instream flows
are bound to fail, among other reasons, because of the public good characteristics of water and society's
unique valuation of water). Often used metaphors for public goods-like "spillover effects" and "com-
mon pool resource"-come from water. Id. The term "public good" means resources characterized by
non-rivalry and non-excludability in consumption. Bonnie G. Colby, Benefits, Costs and Water Acquisi-
tion Strategies: Economic Considerations in Instream Flow Protection, in Instream Flow Protection in
the West 6-1, 6-22 (Lawrence J. Macdonnell & Teresa A. Rice, eds., Univ. of Colo. Sch. of L. Nat.
Resources L. Ctr. 1993).
33. Gillilan & Brown, supra n. 3, at 120 (noting the argument that private ownership might not be
compatible with the state's public trust duties to water); Protecting Instream Flows Under Western
Water Law: Selected Papers, in Instream Flow Information Paper No. 2 18 (Berton Lamb, ed. U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service 1978) (noting that "Water is preserved so that the public may enjoy the beauty of a
waterfall, the thrill of rafting down a wild river, or the joy of catching a trout on a dry fly") [hereinafter
Western Water].
34. Neuman & Chapman, supra n. 21, at 170.
35. Colby, supra n. 32, at 6-22. The "free rider" problem is that public goods will tend to be under
produced by market forces alone because demand will be underestimated. People count on others to
produce the necessary amount of a good with public benefit; they can then use it at no cost.
36. Id.
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The second argument for agency-only instream systems stems from fears
of speculation, either for economic or environmental motives. 37 Instream
rights by their nature forego the traditional diversion requirement of prior
appropriation, which proves the appropriator is diligently putting water to
"beneficial use." 38 Since the beneficial uses of instream rights are necessar-
ily instream, private instream owners could appropriate for "beneficial use
without doing anything at all," giving investors an economic disincentive to
develop and reason to hold water for speculation instead.39 Similarly, be-
cause of the relatively low cost and ease of instream appropriation, all re-
maining unappropriated water could be "tied up," not by economic specula-
tors, but by conservationists, and therefore become unavailable for future
development purposes.4n
If instream rights must exist, traditional consumptive users prefer state
agency control, where they have political leverage, over ownership by pri-
vate, independent organizations. 41 The fear of speculation is probably the
largest impetus behind states limiting instream ownership to public agen-
cies.42
B. The Criticism of Public Instream Rights
Prior appropriation states' decisions to permit only public instream rights
produced a less than ideal record for evaluation. In light of that record,
some commentators argue that agencies alone are inadequate to provide
instream protection.43 First, they argue, agencies do not have enough fund-
ing to adequately acquire and properly administer instream rights.44 Water
rights, especially senior rights, can cost a great deal to purchase, and agen-
37. Gillilan & Brown, supra n. 3, at 123; Thompson, supra n. 4, at 289.
38. Gillilan & Brown, supra n. 3, at 123.
39. Id. See also Western Water, supra n. 33, at 17 (noting "It is the willingness of an appropriator
to invest his time and financial resources in the diversion and use of water which demonstrate his sincer-
ity and evidences that he wants the water for its value to him and not simply for speculative purposes").
40. Gillilan & Brown, supra n. 3, at 123 (citing fears of water hoarding by "lunatics" in Colorado,
"radicals" in Nebraska, and "environmentalists" in Oregon); Gordon Fassett, Wyoming's Instream Flow
Law, in Instream Flow Protection in the West 21-4 (Lawrence J. Macdonnell & Teresa A. Rice, eds.,
Univ. of Colo. Sch. of L. Nat. Resources L. Ctr. 1993) (hypothesizing that state ownership of instream
rights stems from concern that "radical" interests would acquire all available waters and hamper devel-
opment); Thompson, supra n. 4, at 288.
41. Gillilan & Brown, supra n. 3, at 123; Thompson, supra n. 4, at 288; see also Janet Schmitt,
Instream Water Rights in Oregon: To Hold or Not to Hold? 39 (unpublished Master's Thesis, Harvard
University 1995) (copy on file with the Oregon Water Trust).
42. Gillilan & Brown, supra n. 3, at 123. This speculative fear is the "crux of the argument" for
publicly held rights. Id. Ironically, given the states' initial intent to protect flows, seem to have placed
the burden of instream rights solely on state agencies to "discourage rather than encourage instream
flow protection." Id. at 127.
43. Sterne, supra n. 7, at 215-219.
44. Id. at 216.
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45cies are not adequately budgeted for such expenses. At best, agencies can
only acquire rights with junior priority dates and preserve the status quo.46
Funding problems are also related to a second criticism: inadequate en-
forcement of water rights and bias in resolution of water disputes. Agencies
do not continually monitor streams; instead, they respond to complaints of
violations.47 An agency-held right might not have a defender against diver-
sionary users' challenges or a watchman to ensure the water is truly left
instream.48 Unlike most federal environmental statutes, the public has no
enforcement role with agency held instream rights.49 Further, if the agency
is both the owner of a right and the enforcer, the state's sovereign and pro-
prietary roles blur.50 The result most often is to the detriment of the in-
stream right. One commentator noted that the close ties of traditional water
users to their watermasters5' makes state officials uncooperative in enforc-
ing instream flow rights. 52 These agency deficiencies and biases may there-
fore short-change any publicly held instream rights.53
Third, agencies bring bureaucratic baggage. Red tape and administrative
delay, as well as a susceptibility to political ideological shifts, limit the ef-
fectiveness of agencies in instream rights acquisition and protection.54
45. Id. at 22 1.
46. Id. at 215.
47. Neuman & Chapman, supra n. 21, at 172.
48. Janis E. Carpenter, Enforcement of Instream Water Rights 18-21 (Northwest Water Law &
Policy Project 1995) (available from Northwest Water Law & Policy Project, Northwestern School of
Law of Lewis and Clark College). Since the owner of the right must complain, the general public would
not be able to intervene on behalf of the instream right being violated. Id.
49. Lori Potter, People Preserving Rivers: The Public and its Changing Role in Protecting In-
stream Flows, in Instream Flow Protection in the West 3-2 (Lawrence J. Macdonnell & Teresa A. Rice,
eds., Univ. of Colo. Sch. of L. Nat. Resources L. Ctr. 1993). For arguments how and why the public
should have an enforcement role for public instream rights, see Lori Potter, The Public's Role in the
Acquisition and Enforcement ofinstream Flows, 23 Land and Water L. Rev. 419,432 (1988).
50. Neuman & Chapman, supra n. 21, at 172.
5 1. Watermasters are the state agency water enforcement officers. Carpenter, supra n. 48, at 19.
52. Thompson, supra n. 4, at 283; Carpenter, supra n. 48, at 20. Another com-
mentator interprets these "close ties" not as an inherent conflict in the state's role
but as a flaw in the prior appropriation system itself: prior appropriation changes its
rules (or the rules are altered by those with power) to protect the existing status
quo. Reed Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo: Protecting Established Water Uses
in the Pacific Northwest, Despite the Rules of Prior Appropriation, 28 Envtl. L.
881, 909 (1998) (noting that "[i]nstream uses probably suffer most under the status
quo policy"). The result is the same: inadequate representation and protection of
instream rights.
53. Steme, supra n. 7, at 217-218; Leshy, supra n. 17 at 170.
54. Sterne, supra n. 7, at 218.
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C. The Case for Privately Held Instream Rights55
The problems identified above could be alleviated by permitting pri-
vately held instream rights to supplement public agency rights. First, a pri-
vate owner who has a financial investment in a property right likely will be
a more effective defender of this right, both in monitoring for violations and
56in pursuing enforcement. As one commentator noted, "people using the
water rights are in the best position to know whether their rights are being
damaged by the actions of others. 57 The private owner will not have any
"dual role" loyalty problems inherent to the state; private ownership would
grant each instream right a proper "champion and a defender, not dependant
on the vagaries of state funding or politics for its protection.,
58
Second, fear of speculation where a state permits private rights is un-
founded, because state water code procedures provide that each application
for an instream right is subject to the same administrative reviews and
checks as diversionary rights. Agencies therefore can reject or condition
speculative or suspect applications.59 Moreover, privately owned instream
rights do not hamper water development any more than consumptive rights.
Every resource use, instream or diversionary, has opportunity CoStS. 60 Fi-
nally, priority prevents any senior right from being affected by a junior
right, including instream rights. 61
Third, private ownership and market forces would do a better job than
the state determining correct allocation of instream rights. Private acquisi-
tion creates a more efficient market for water rights because of lowered
transaction CoStS,62 increased flexibility, and local knowledge and interest.
63
Local individuals arguably are in a better position to determine the neces-
sity of instream protections than harried state agencies. 64 Private rights
55. A private instream right, for the purposes of this paper, is one held by a private individual or
organization.
56. Janet Neuman et al., Restoring the Waters 17 (Univ. of Colo. Sch. of L. Nat. Resources L. Ctr.
1997).
57. Gillilan & Brown, supra n. 3, at 125.
58. Neuman & Chapman, supra n. 21, at 172. The general public cannot enforce an agency held
right. See supra n. 49.
59. Leshy, supra n. 17, at 172; Thompson, supra n. 4, at 291. Almost all prior appropriation states
also subject applications for water rights to a public interest review. For discussion on public interest
review, see infra, n. 147 and accompanying test.
60. Meyer, supra n. 20, at 2-13.
61. "Priority" is an essential feature of the doctrine of prior appropriation. An appropriator who is
"first in time" has the highest priority, and therefore a right to use the water (beneficially) before others.
Getches, supra n. 18, at 101. His right cannot be injured by those junior to him. Id.
62. Whether transactions costs can actually be lowered is debatable. For discussion on the role of
the "no injury" rule, see infra nn. 105, 146, and 165.
63. Crammond, supra n. 15, at 240; Neuman et al., supra n. 56, at 17; Gillilan & Brown, supra n.
3, at 125.
64. Grey, supra n. 8, at 705. "Local fishermen, rafting companies, recreational users, and conserva-
tion organizations are likely to be far more aware both of impeding threats to a particular river and of
the benefits of preserving a certain level of streamflow than would a government agency charged with
managing all instream appropriations in the state." Id.
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could create even higher standards for flows than the "political median" of
the state. 65 Also, because the science of instream flows is still young, per-
mitting private flows would provide an opportunity for increased scientific
dialogue.66 Because agencies would also still hold rights, their existence
would balance long-term instability inherent in a purely private market sys-
tem.
Fourth, private ownership of instream water rights creates a different
type of protection: a type of property right.67 As a property right, such a
right theoretically would not be subject to shifting political winds, as are
regulatory restrictions. The constitutional protection afforded property
rights, which cannot be taken by state or federal government without com-
68pensation, are fundamentally distinct from any state water system.
Finally, a market of privately held instream flow rights should be permit-
ted to supplement agency-held rights because the agency-only limitation is
contrary to the basic tenets of the doctrine of prior appropriation. Histori-
cally, water rights were available to anyone who put water to beneficial use
without waste.69 Now that most states recognize beneficial instream uses,
there should be no further restraint on the natural market system. The public
character of instream flows-their nonexclusive benefits and "public-good"
characteristics7°-suggests only that it should not be left entirely up to pri-
vate organizations to provide flows; it does not logically exclude private
supplementation of public flows through marketplace mechanisms. 71 In-
stream uses can be valued economically just like diversionary uses-the
value of any water use is dependent on the opportunity costs of other possi-
ble uses.72 If the law allows and the value of instream use is greater than
that of other uses, the water will remain instream. The main obstacles to
market transfers of water instream are then the legal impediments that states
65. Thompson, supra n. 4, at 286; Leshy, supra n. 17, at 173. Where agency might be reluctant to
apply for an instream appropriation because of political repercussions, a private organization might not
have those apprehensions. Leshy, supra n. 17, at 173.
66. Thompson, supra n. 4, at 286. For more on how scientific difficulties hamper private instream
rights, see infra section V(C).
67. In appropriation states, a water right is a usufructurary right, not a possessory right, but still a
property right. See supra n. 29.
68. Meyer, supra n. 20, at 2-13; Sterne, supra n. 7, at 220; Neuman et al., supra n. 56, at 17. The
benefit of "holding" instream rights can be seen through the experience of the Oregon Water Trust
(OWT). The organization was originally formed to buy and hold instream rights in Oregon; however
agency officials interpreted the 1987 state instream statute as only permitting state agencies to hold such
rights. Neuman & Chapman, supra n. 21, at 137-138, 167-168; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §537.348(l),
537.332(3) (2001). OWT therefore became a sort of broker: buying consumptive water rights for use
instream and transferring them to the state. However if the Oregon legislature alters the relevant statute
to disallow such transfers or the status of agency rights, OWT will not have any property to claim taken-
just funding and efforts wasted. Neuman & Chapman, supra n. 21, at 167-168.
69. Meyer, supra n. 20, at 2-13; Sterne, supra n. 7, at 220. The argument that all traditional water
uses were out of stream is short-sighted: all of the "beneficial uses" of the original inhabitants-fishing,
commerce, and navigation-took place instream. Gillilan & Brown, supra n. 3, at 9.
70. See supra n. 32-36 and accompanying text.
71. Thompson, supra n. 4, at 289; Gillilan & Brown, supra n. 3, at 126.
72. Huffman, supra n. 17, at 276-277.
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enact-like constraints on ownership and transfer-not the nature of water
itself.73
If the concern is the "public good" character of water, it is hardly clear
why it is safe or fair to trust private individuals to own that good by holding
a usufructuary right offstream but not instream.74 The same administrative
checks-beneficial use and public interest review-can and do exist in ei-
ther use; access and ownership should therefore be the same for both types
of water use.75 Some private parties, like hydroelectric power, hold state
granted non-consumptive appropriations. 76 Finally, in comparison, the ri-
parian rights doctrine-the water law of the eastern half of the United
States-recognizes private rights instream.77
D. Analysis of the Debate
First, arguments for the addition of privately held instream flows are
theoretically more persuasive than any rationalization of public-only sys-
tems. A prior appropriation state with agency-held instream flow rights (or
a mandated minimum flow 78 reserved from appropriation) supplemented by
the opportunity to appropriate and hold instream rights privately seems to
offer the model system. Specifically, the agency problems of funding, en-
forcement, and bureaucratic lethargy are mitigated by private market impe-
tus while private, market-based motives, which alone would be too unstable
and subject to individual caprice, are supported by a layer of public control.
Second, in many ways the debate illustrates that the real driving force
behind the restriction on private ownership of instream flows is the opposi-
tion of traditional consumptive water users of the American West, espe-
cially irrigation agriculture. 79 Fears of adverse effects from private instream
rights and a general distrust of change outweigh any state legislature's con-
cern over protection of flows. 80 It is, according to the defenders of the status
quo, better to have the water held instream by the state, where decision
makers are accountable through elections and lobbying, than in the hands of
73. Id. at 278-280; Colby, supra n. 32, at 6-21. The Alaska experience as discussed supra section
V arguably illustrates this point.
74. Gillilan & Brown, supra n. 3, at 126; Leshy, supra n. 17, at 171 (questioning if there are "genu-
ine differences between allowing a rancher, farmer, utility, city, or industry to gain private rights in
water, and allowing the local rod and gun club or the Nature Conservancy from doing the same").
75. Gillilan & Brown, supra n. 3, at 126.
76. Leshy, supra n. 17, at 172. The benefit of such use is also arguably public.
77. Los Angeles v. Aitken, 52 P.2d 585 (Cal. App. 1935) (stating riparian rights extend to "aesthetic
value" of the water instream as opposed to requiring diversion).
78. For discussion on minimum flow reservations, see infra discussion section VI(B).
79. This opposition is not the only example of traditional water users altering the basic tenents of
prior appropriation to protect the status quo. Benson, supra n. 52, at 909.
80. Federal agencies and environmental organizations, two prime candidates for private instream
rights, are also generally mistrusted by the traditional agricultural community. Gillilan & Brown, supra
n. 3, at 123.
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private individuals---even if such command and control regulation runs
counter to the current of prior appropriation. 8'
In one western state, however, traditional water users did not push water-
sheds to the brink of exhaustion before the instream flow awakening; eco-
nomic development has not yet reached the point of draining the river
flows. Alaska's developmental youth, coupled with the relative absence of
irrigation interests, makes it unique among western states and helps explain
why it opted for a different approach to instream flow rights.82 The next
section examines why Alaska's experience is a revealing case study in prior
appropriation states' experiments with private instream flow rights.
III. ALASKA AS THE LABORATORY: WATER AND WATER LAW IN ALASKA
A. Water in Alaska: A Golden Opportunity
As noted earlier, Alaska was the first and remains one of the few states to
enact legislation permitting privately held instream rights.83 This statutory
anomaly alone makes Alaska one of a few possible empirical case studies
for private instream purposes. An examination of several other Alaskan
characteristics, however, is essential to fully understand the Alaska private
instream flow experiment. First, compared to other prior appropriation
states, water opportunities abound in Alaska. Alaska has more than 40% of
84the entire United States' surface water resources. It has over three million
lakes, more than 12,000 rivers, and thousands of streams and creeks.85 De-
spite these attractive hydrologic figures, water remains largely unappropri-
ated-less than 1% of Alaska's rivers and lakes have appropriations.86 By
one count, there are 15,000 fish-bearing bodies of water in Alaska, or
60,000 potential instream flow rights. 87 Alaska therefore is in a unique posi-
tion: it has a chance to integrate instream flows into its prior appropriation
system before, not after, most developmental water appropriation.
81. Meyer, supra n. 20, at 2-13. In an oft-quoted (but overstated) argument, Meyer characterized
the limitation of instream fights to public agencies as a principle of "socialism." Id.
82. Mary Ray White, Opportunities To Protect Instream Flows in Alaska 8 (Biological Services
Program, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1982).
83. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.145; see infra. n. 23.
84. Christopher Estes, Address to the American Society of Civil Engineers World Water and
Environmental Resources Congress I (May 2001) (copy of transcript on file with the Alaska Dept. of
Fish and Game).
85. Mary Lu Harle & Christopher Estes, An Assessment ofInstream Flow Protection in Alaska, in
Instream Flow Protection in the Western United States, 9-1 (Lawrence J. Macdonnell & Teresa A. Rice,
eds., Univ. of Colo. Sch. of L. Nat. Resources L. Ctr. 1993). Of the thirty largest rivers in the United
States, six are in Alaska. Robert Anderson, Alaska Considers Innovative Instream Flow Law, 2 Rivers
255, 256 (1992).
86. Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game, Instream Flow Program, State Aquatic Resources Coordina-
tion Unit Home Page http://www.sf.adfg.state.ak.us/statewideINSTFLOW/isfhome.htm (accessed
November 2, 2002).
87. Estes, supra n. 25, at 10. This number was reached by estimating four different instream flow
reaches, a conservative estimate, for each water body. Id. These rights would be for fish and wildlife
beneficial uses.
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Second, water instream is arguably more important in Alaska than any-
where else in the United States. Flowing water was historically and is pres-
ently critical in Alaska for a number of economic, recreational, and aes-
thetic reasons, such as native subsistence and cultural survival, 88 commer-
cial and sport fishing,89 tourism,9° transportation for boats and planes,9'
water-related recreational opportunities like canoeing, hiking, camping,
kayaking, and hunting, and instream industrial uses like placer mining92 and
small hydroelectric projects.93 The importance of water to Alaska's econ-
omy would seem to make Alaska a perfect model for privately owned in-
stream flows.
94
B. Water Law in Alaska
Alaska's constitution and water code also foster an opportunity for pri-
vate instream flow rights. Article VIII, section 13 of the Alaska Constitu-
tion establishes Alaska as a prior appropriation state where "[p]riority of
appropriation shall give prior right., 95 Appropriation of water is limited to
11 ,96
"stated uses," and equal preference is given to "beneficial uses, with a
preference only to the public water supply.97 When appropriated, water
becomes a type of property right, a usufructuary or use right.98 As a prop-
erty right, water rights are protected from "involuntary divestment." 99 How-
88. Ryan Peel, Katie John v, United States: Balancing Alaska State Sovereignty with a Native
Grandmother's Right to Fish, 15 BYU J. Pub. L. 263, 266 (2001); Anderson, supra n. 85, at 256.
89. After oil and government, commercial and sport fishing are the largest economic industries in
the state. Estes, supra n. 84, at I.
90. Tourism is the fourth largest industry in the state. Id.
91. Transportation, for both commodities and people, is dependent on float or ski plane in many
communities of roadless Alaska. Anderson, supra n. 85, at 256.
92. Placer mining involves obtaining minerals from placers by instream washing or dredging.
93. Harle & Estes, supra n. 85, at 9- I. Despite the abundance of water, areas of present and future
conflict with consumptive uses exist. Population growth, urbanization, oil, mining, hydroelectric devel-
opment, municipal water supplies, ,and most recently, large scale water export and bottling, all raise
potential water allocation questions and conflicts. Id.; Estes, supra n. 84, at 2. Large scale water export-
ing was statutorily approved in 1992. Id. For more on water export in Alaska, see infra n. 153 and ac-
companying text.
94. Two examples might be the owner of a remote fishing lodge who needs to guarantee she will
have enough water for fly-in fishing tourists, or an isolated native village needing to guarantee it will
have enough flow for both fishing and transportation.
95. Alaska Const. art. VIII, § 13; see also Paug Vik, Inc. v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 633 P.2d
1015 (Alaska 1981).
96. Beneficial uses are enumerated statutorily. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.260(3) (LEXIS 2001). The list
now includes four instream uses. Id. For further discussion on instream beneficial uses, see infra n. 110
and accompanying text.
97. Id.
98. Owsicheck, 763 P.2d at 493.
99. Alaska Const. art. VIII, § 16. The exception of divestment of right is only for "superior benefi-
cial use or public purpose and then only with just compensation and by operation of law." Id. The only
constitutionally "superior" beneficial use is the public water supply. Alaska Const. art. VIII, § 13.
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ever, any appropriation of water in Alaska is also constitutionally subject to
"the general reservation of fish and wildlife."' °
The Alaska Water Use Act of 1966101 (Water Use Act) established the
Alaska water code and empowered the Alaska Department of Natural Re-
sources (ADNR) with the authority to manage and allocate water re-
sources. 0 2 The water code is similar to that of other prior appropriation
states, where applicant-appropriators must apply for a permit for specified
"beneficial uses."' 1 3 After a public notice period, a permit for appropriation
may issue, which grants the applicant the opportunity to establish beneficial
use by developing the water. Once the applicant has "proved up" her claim
by meeting the permit conditions and statutory requirements, ADNR issues
a certificate of appropriation. '04 Transfer, lease, or sale of water rights must
all be approved by ADNR.' °5 The right has the priority of the original date
of application and can be conditioned or denied by ADNR to meet the pub-
lic interest. 16 An extensive list of public interest criteria-including someinstream benefits-is enumerated statutorily.'0 7
IV. THE 1980 INSTREAM FLOW ACT AND ITS RESULTS
A. The Instream Flow Act
The Alaska legislature amended the Water Use Act in 1980 in three sig-
nificant ways. First, lawmakers altered the statutory provision permitting
the appropriation of water-otherwise reserved for the public-to also
100. Alaska Const. art. VIII, § 13. This "general reservation" clause can be interpreted as merely
granting the legislature the ability to enact laws automatically reserving water for fish and wildlife or as
a constitutional mandate to do so. Harle and Estes, supra n. 85, at 9-5. The Alaska Supreme Court has
not yet directly addressed this constitutional question. See Tulkisarmute Native Community Council v.
Heinze, 898 P.2d 935, 952 (Alaska 1995). The clause at the very least illustrates a constitutional under-
standing of the importance of water instream in Alaska.
101. Water Use Act, Alaska Stat. §§ 46.15.010- 46.15.270 (LEXIS 2001).
102. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.010; Alaska Stat. §§ 46.15.040-46.15.140 (LEXIS 2001).
103. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.040; Alaska Stat. § 46.15.080 (LEXIS 2001).
104. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.040.
105. Any transfer of water in prior appropriation states is subject to the "no injury" rule: any transfer
of right or change in use cannot harm junior appropriators (senior appropriators are protected by prior-
ity). The burden of proving that there is no harm is on the party seeking the transfer. Sax et al., supra n.
23, at 230; Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist. v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 720 P.2d 133, 146
(Colo. 1986); W.S. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 439 P.2d 714 (N.M. 1968).
106. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.050 (LEXIS 2001).
107. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.080(b):
"In determining the public interest, the commissioner shall consider:
(1) the benefit to the applicant resulting from the proposed appropriation;
(2) the effect of the economic activity resulting from the proposed appropriation;
(3) the effect on fish and game resources and on public recreational opportunities;
(4) the effect on public health;
(5) the effect of loss of alternate uses of water that might be made within a reasonable time if not pre-
cluded or hindered by the proposed appropriation;
(6) harm to other persons resulting from the proposed appropriation;
(7) the intent and ability of the applicant to complete the appropriation; and
(8) the effect upon access to navigable or public water."
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permit reservation of instream flows. 0 8 Legislators also amended the defi-
nition of "appropriation" to include an instream reservation of flow."°9 Sec-
ond, the new legislation enlarged the statutory list of appropriative "benefi-
cial" uses by adding three new uses-all instream. 10 Third, lawmakers
created a new statutory section, section 46.15.145, entitled "Reservation of
Water.""' Section 46.15.145 established the requirements necessary for an
applicant to receive a certificate of reservation and incorporated them into
the water code, to be administered by ADNR." 2 The amendments are col-
lectively known as the Instream Flow Act. ADNR formulated the Alaska
Administrative Code (AAC) regulations for instream flow rights three years
later, in 1983, fleshing out the amendments.' 13
Private instream flow advocates find the magic language of the Instream
Flow Act in subsection (a) of 46.15.145, which states "the state, an agency
or a political subdivision of the state, an agency of the United States or a
person may apply to the commissioner to reserve sufficient water to main-
tain a specified instream flow.""14  Quite simply, this statutory language
remains the clearest, most explicit statement by any prior appropriation
state on private ownership of instream water rights. That wording explains
why Alaska offers, as one commentator put it, "the greatest opportunity for
private citizen involvement in an instream flow program."'" 5 Interestingly,
although there was support for instream flow rights for fish and wildlife and
economic uses," 16 the chief motivation behind its passage was entirely dif-
ferent. State officials, concerned over new federal reserved water policies,
thought the act would sway the balance of the state-federal conflict over
water control in their favor." 
7
108. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.030 (LEXIS 2001). "Wherever occurring in a natural state, the water is
reserved to the people for common use and is subject to appropriation and beneficial use and to reserva-
tion of instrean flows and levels of water, as provided in this chapter." Id. (Emphasis added).
109. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.260(2) (LEXIS L. 2001). "[Alppropriation means the diversion, impound-
ing, or withdrawal of a quantity of water from a source of water for a beneficial use or the reservation of
water under AS 46.15.145." Id.
110. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.260(3). The added uses are navigation, transportation, and maintenance of
water quality. Two other instream beneficial uses, fish and wildlife and recreational uses, existed before
the 1980 amendments. Id.
Ill. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.145.
112. Id.
113. Alaska Admin. Code tit. II, §§ 93.141-147 (2002). For relevant definitions, see Alaska Admin.
Code tit. 1I, 93.970 (2002).
114. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.145(a) (LEXIS 2001) (emphasis added). A "person" as used is defined as
"an individual, partnership, association, public or private corporation, state agency, political subdivision
of the state, and the United States." Alaska Stat. § 46.15.260(7) (LEXIS 2001).
115. Covell, supra n. 6, at 193.
116. Senate Resources Committee, File on Maintenance of Stream Flows and Levels of Water, 1980
Alaska Sess. L. ch. 1 1-1 18, 2.
117. The federal reserved water rights (FRWR) doctrine recognizes that federal lands set aside for a
particular purpose an adequate quantity of water to fulfill that purpose. Cappaert v. U.S., 426 U.S. 128,
138 (1976). In 1978, state and federal officials were in the middle of negotiations over FRWRs in
Alaska. Since 49% of Alaska is federal land, the amount of water in question was significant. The fed-
eral reservations included instream uses, which presented a problem: the state water code did not have a
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B. The Results: "Paradise Confounded"'"18
The history of private instream flow rights in Alaska can be summed up
in one word: abysmal. After twenty-two years, 1980-2002, no private party
yet owns a certificate of reservation-only two private applicants com-
pleted and "proved up" their applications satisfactorily enough to warrant
an agency adjudication. 19 Between 1980 and 2000, there were 237 applica-
tions for instream rights-76 by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game
(ADF&G), 156 by the federal government, but only 8 by private parties. 120
Of those eight, four were by the Anchorage Audubon Society, two by pri-
vate individuals, one by the student chapter of the American Fisheries Soci-
ety (AFS), and one by the Juneau Chapter of Trout Unlimited (TU).1
2
'
ADNR rejected the four Audubon applications for insufficient scientific
information. 22 ADNR also rejected the two applications by private indi-
viduals-submitted in 1982 for water quality purposes and lake level, re-
spectively-for preceding the implementing AAC regulations, and there-
fore void. 123 ADNR accepted the remaining two private applications, of TU
and AFS, who each then "proved up their claim" with the necessary data; 124
process for reserving water instream. Christopher Estes, Alaska Response to WSWC Survey Regarding
Federal Reserved Water Rights, in Report for the Western States Water Council: Federal Non-Indian
Claims to Water 3 (February 22, 1999). That same year, the U.S. Department of the Interior issued a
new opinion claiming the existence of "federal non-reserved water rights," which would arise from
actual use instead of reservation. Department of the Interior Solicitor's Opinion No. M-36914, Federal
Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation and the
Bureau of Land Management, 86 Interior Dec. 553 (1979). With these new rights federal agencies could
claim instream flows even if no prior federal reservation existed or the state did not recognize appropria-
tions of instream flows. State officials feared these new "non-reserved" rights would permit unilateral
federal determination of the water in question. Legislators also believed an instream bill, if enacted,
created an adjudication "mechanism" to quantify FRWRs in state procedure and, in the case of dis-
agreement, state court. It was the prevention of a federal incursion of state control, especially in light of
the new federal policy that could encompass much more water, that made the instream bill a priority to
pass. Estes, supra n. 117, at 3. Ironically, legislators were wrong on both accounts: the non-reserve
rights opinion was short-lived and never acted upon and it took another amendment to the Alaska water
code-six years later-to solve the state-federal dispute. Sax et al., supra n. 23, at 872; Alaska Stat. §§
46.15.165-169 (LEXIS 2002).
118. Burkhardt, supra n. 24, at I.
119. Interview with Christopher Estes, Instream Flow Coordinator, Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game
(July 18, 2002).
120. Christopher Estes, Annual Summary of Instream Flow Reservations and Protections in Alaska,
in Fishery Data Series No. 98-0, 9 (ADF&G 1998). Since 1998, ADF&G has not completed any new
applications due to internal re-organization and training. Agency instream applications will resume in
2003. Telephone Interview with Christopher Estes, Instream Flow Coordinator, ADF&G (November,
2002).
121. Id.
122. Id. The scientific requirements for instream flow applications are quite extensive and time-
consuming. This problem is explored infra, section V(c).
123. Harle and Estes, supra n. 85, at 9-13.
124. This data collection must use an approved methodology and include both the quantity and
biological/chemical justifications for the reservation. I I Alaska Admin. Code tit. 93 § 147 (2001). For
example, a reservation for fish propagation and migration must include temporal evidence of when and
what seasonal fish activity occurs, the types of fish and lifecycles present, the amount and depth of
water present each month at any time in the stretch of water in question, the water's daily temperature
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they now await final adjudication by ADNR for their certificate of reserva-
tion. ADNR, however, has not adjudicated an instream water right since
1990, and consequently these applications are still pending. No private in-
dividuals or organizations applied for instream flow rights after 1991 until
The Nature Conservancy of Alaska (TNC) in 2000.125 During the same pe-
riod, from 1980-2003, state and federal agencies were more prolific in fil-
ing applications, but did not fair much better in result. 126 Alaska is therefore
a tale of great expectations and very limited instream flow right successes.
A close examination of the statute reveals the reasons for such discrepancy
between opportunity and result.
V. LEGAL HANDICAPS: THE ANATOMY OF A "SECOND CLASS" RIGHT
A. Name Games: Reservation or Right?
Although the 1980 statute authorized private instream water rights and
therefore the possibility of a market, it also created many substantial barri-
ers. The first potential barrier is present in both the title and the language of
the statute-is this "reservation of water"'127 a property right? A "reserva-
tion" in western water law normally refers to the state power to reserve a
minimum or automatic flow from appropriation, not a type of appropriation.
A survey of states illustrates that some authorize "appropriations" of in-
stream rights;128 some have "reserved" a minimum instream flow from ap-
propriation. 29 A "reservation" in Alaska, however, is despite the confusing
language, a property right. First, the statutory definition of "appropriation"
was explicitly altered to include a reservation under section 46.15.145 of
and velocity, and other factors necessary to determine how much water is necessary to guarantee the
"beneficial use" is fulfilled. This problem is explored further infra, section V(c).
125. ADNR accepted TNC's application and TNC is currently collecting the hydrologic data neces-
sary for ADNR to eventually adjudicate it: median flow temperatures, depth, ph, and current speed
measured daily for three years by remote gage. The application's stated purpose is fish propagation and
migration in Lower Talerik Creek, a well-known salmon and trout fishery appurtenant to TNC land in
Western Alaska. Interview with Paul Jackson, Program Director, TNC of Alaska (July 1, 2002).
126. Among federal agencies, both the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the United States
Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS) have applied for instream rights-four by the BLM and 152 by the
USFWS (12 rivers and 140 lakes). Estes, supra n. 120, at 9. ADNR approved and granted only one of
those applications: BLM's first application, for fish and wildlife habitat and recreation use on Beaver
Creek National Wild River, in 1989. Harle and Estes, supra n. 85, at 9-13. It remains the only federal
agency instream right ADNR has ever granted. Estes, supra n. 120, at 9. Among Alaska state agencies,
only the ADF&G has applied for instream rights. Harle and Estes, supra n. 85, at 9-12. Beginning in
1986, ADF&G filed 76 (75 rivers and one lake) applications for flows. Estes, supra n. 120, at 9. ADNR
approved 10 instream rights to ADF&G for fish and wildife between 1987 and 1989, but not one since.
Id.
127. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.145. The statute never uses the term instream water right, instead using
"reservation of water" instream. Id.
128. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-15 1A (West Supp. 1997); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-102(3) (1997);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-1001(b) (1997); Idaho Code § 42-1501 (1997); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 536.310(7)
(1997); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533.030 (1995); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-202 (1997). Except Arizona and Nevada,
theses states limit ownership of such rights to state agencies.
129. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.145(a); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 82a-703b (1997).
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the water code. 130 Second, the term "reservation" usually refers to an action
of the state, either legislative or administrative;' 31 a statute cannot logically
permit a regulation to be held by a private individual. Third, Alaska's statu-
tory scheme treats section 46.15.145 exactly like a right: it is incorporated
into the Water Use Act, and it must be adjudicated by ANDR like other
water rights. Finally, ADNR agency policy is that instream reservations are
similar to property rights. 132 This confusing wording, however, foreshadows
another more serious statutory weakness. While section 46.15.145 creates a
property right, it is a second-class right.
B. A Defensible Right: The Review Provision
Subsection (f) of 46.15.145 states that an instream reservation, once
granted, must be reviewed at least every ten years by the ADNR commis-
sioner for continuing "purpose" and "findings."'' 33 If the ADNR commis-
sioner determines that the "purpose, or part or all of the findings" are no
longer applicable, she may revoke or modify the right. 134 Consumptive wa-
ter rights are not subject to such a mandatory review. 35 Further, the com-
missioner can review at his or her discretion the instream reservation at any
time before the statutory ten years under several circumstances, including if
water is unavailable for a subsequent consumptive applicant, who protests
the justification for the existing instream reservation. 36 Other circum-
stances in which the instream reservation can be reviewed include a "sig-
130. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.260(l). Montana's also defines appropriation to include reservation of
instream flow. Mont. Code. Ann. § 85-2-102(1)(b) (1997).
131. Leshy, supran. 17, at 165;Covell, supran. 6, at 191.
132. ADNR, Fact Sheet: Reserving Water for Instream Use http://www.dnr.state.ak.us/mlw/factsht/
wtrfs/instream.pdf (last accessed Feb. 29, 2004) ("reservation of water for instream use is a water
right..."); Tulkisarmute, 898 P.2d at 941 (quoting the definition of "appropriation," which includes
instream reservation, and then holding the "appropriator is entitled to a water right, a full and permanent
property right in that quantity of water").
133. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.145(f) (LEXIS 2001). The "purpose" is the beneficial uses statutorily
permitted for instream reservations: "(1) protection of fish and wildlife habitat, migration, and propaga-
tion; (2) recreation and parks purposes; (3) navigation and transportation purposes; and (4) sanitary and
water quality purposes." Alaska Stat. § 46.15.145(a)(1-4) (LEXIS 2001). The "findings" are those
original conclusions of the commissioner that in granting the instream reservation: "(1) the rights of
prior appropriators will not be affected by the reservation; (2) the applicant has demonstrated that a need
exists for the reservation; (3) there is unappropriated water in the stream or body of water sufficient for
the reservation; and (4) the proposed reservation is in the public interest." Alaska Stat. §
46.15.145(c)(1-4) (LEXIS 2001).
134. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.145(f). Proper notice and hearing requirements must be met in any such
revocation or modification, as well as a written determination that doing so "is in the best interests of the
state." Id.
135. The legislative history of the Instream Flow Act shows the review provision was intended both
to be a check on overzealous amounts of instream appropriation and to replace the traditional doctrine of
abandonment for instream uses. Since there would be little or not construction to "abandon," the legisla-
tors argued, instream rights must be reviewed for purpose. Alaska H. Res. and Sen. Resource Comm.
Audio Tapes, Hearings on HB 118, 11 th Leg., 2nd Sess., (April 18, 1980) (as listened to by the author,
available at Anchorage AK Law Library).
136. Alaska Admin. Code tit. II, § 93.147(a)(3) (2001).
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nificant change" to the watershed or if the reservation was granted but con-
ditioned to an earlier review.
137
This review provision makes instream water rights in Alaska second-
class rights because they are defeasible, not vested. Unlike diversionary
water rights, an instream right's worth is clouded by the uncertainty caused
by ADNR's ability to modify or revoke that right at will. The advantages of
private property (protection from political instability) and market-based
solutions (what is the value of such a defeasible right?) dissolve when di-
luted by such a review provision. This large disincentive explains the rela-
tive lack of interest in privately held instream flow rights in Alaska.
C. "Demonstrated Need": The Scientific Burden on the Applicant
For those private parties who choose to apply for instream rights despite
the review provision, the instream act and its regulations create a very high
informational burden that is placed on no other water appropriations.13 8
First, an application must include the type and description of data analysis,
the physical, biological, chemical, and socio-economic data substantiating
the need, and an identification and explanation of the type of methodology
to be used in quantification.139 This information is necessary just to get to
the permit stage. 40 If granted, the applicant is given a three-year time frame
to gather the data necessary to "prove up" her scientific claim. For con-
sumptive rights, this "proving up" is usually the construction of means of
diversion; for instream rights, this "proving up" is usually collecting and
analyzing the necessary data to prove the claim of need. The necessary ex-
pertise for these sophisticated scientific requirements and analyses is be-
yond the capability of most private would-be applicants. 142
137. Alaska Admin. Code tit. 1I, §§ 93.147(a)(1-2) (2001).
138. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.145(c)(2) (the applicant must demonstrate the need for the reservation).
Note that the majority of private applicants were unable to meet the initial application burden. See
discussion supra, section IV(B). Even a national conservation organization like The Nature Conser-
vancy might not have a hydrologist on staff. In July 2002 the author-as a summer legal intern, not a
scientific graduate assistant-accompanied scientists contracted from ADF&G in the installation of
necessary flow gauges for TNC's instream application on Lower Talarik Creek in Western Alaska.
These scientific burdens even challenge state agencies with much more expertise in the still developing
science of instream flow measurement. Estes, supra n. 25, at 10-1I.
139. Alaska Admin. Code tit. l1, § 93.142 (2001).
140. As noted in discussion on the Water Use Act, supra, in section HI(B), after ADNR accepts an
application for a water right, ADNR grants the applicant a permit. The applicant must then "prove up"
her claim in the specified time. This stage is called the permit stage.
141. Alaska Admin. Code tit. 1I, § 93.142. While there is a time limit on the applicant, ADNR has
no time frame under which it must adjudicate applications. This partially explains the long delay for the
two private instream claims that have successfully proven their need. See supra n. 119 and accompany-
ing text.
142. Herb Diship, Instream Flow Water Rights: Arizona's Approach, in Instream Flow Protection in
the West 10-4 (Lawrence J. Macdonnell & Teresa A. Rice, eds., Univ. of Colo. Sch. of L. Nat. Re-
sources L. Ctr. 1993) (citing the same problem in Arizona). For more on similar problems in Arizona,
see infra n. 164.
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The difficulty of meeting this scientific burden is compounded by a prob-
lem unique to Alaska: the limited availability of hydrologic data. For exam-
ple, in 1998, only 78 United States Geologic Survey (USGS) stream flow
gauges were active in Alaska, an average of one every 7,500 square
miles. 143 In almost every case then, a private party attempting to prove up
an application for an instream flow right must first transport and install the
gauges and equipment necessary to gather the requisite flow information.
These data difficulties and expenses are exacerbated by collection impedi-
ments caused by limited road systems, extreme weather, and loss of equip-
ment to wildlife, such as bears.' 44 State agencies like ADNR and ADF&G
require such basic water gauge data for all applications, not to mention for
the enforcement and management of existing rights; its absence is an in-
timidating barrier to any private (or agency) instream rights.1 45 These scien-
tific challenges therefore present yet another disincentive to applicants, as
well as adding market uncertainty and transaction/acquisition costs-
another disabling blow to any private market.
1 46
D. The Missing Provisions: Inherent Agency Discretion
and Budgetary Limitations
As exemplified in subsection (f) of 46.15.145-the review provision-
and the extensive list of "public interest" criteria,147 ADNR has a great deal
of discretion in administering instream water rights."48 In fact, ADNR does
not theoretically have to administer them at all: the statute lacks any time
frame in which instream water rights must be adjudicated by ADNR. This
loophole, coupled with ADNR's indifferent-at-best attitude towards in-
stream flow rights, is part of the reason the agency has not adjudicated any
instream rights since 1991.
49
143. Estes, supra n. 120, at II. This average is compared with an average of I gauge every 377
square miles in the Pacific Northwest. Id.
144. Id.
145. For example, no hydrologic data or field gauge existed for Lower Talarik Creek, the fishery
TNC applied for an instream right on in Western Alaska. See supra n. 138.
146. The Alaska Administrative Code regulations also create a larger market constraint: if and when
a certificate of reservation is issued, it may not be transferred, conveyed, assigned, or converted. Alaska
Admin. Code tit. 11, § 93.146(c)(1) (2001). This regulation seems a superfluous measure since any
transfers are subject to the "no injury" rule. See supra n. 105. This added constraint has less of a nega-
tive impact in Alaska, where there is plenty of unappropriated water, than other western states; still,
since consumptive rights can be transferred, instream rights are again inferior second class rights. Fur-
ther, without a right of alienation, a market for such rights could never function properly. See infra n.
164.
147. In order to grant any water fight, the commissioner must find it is "in the public interest."
Alaska Stat. § 46.15.145(c)(4). Alaska's extensive statutory list of factors, see supra n. 104, and the
amorphous nature of the term "public interest" seem to lend themselves to the personal choice of the
commissioner.
148. All agency decisions are however appealable to the Alaska superior court. Alaska Stat. §
46.15.133(e) (LEXIS 2001).
149. This delay in adjudication has two possible repercussions. First, although applications are by
statute given a priority date once accepted by ADNR, the longer they remain unadjudicated (and not
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There is a second reason for the adjudication standstill: lack of adequate
state budget appropriations to administer the program. 50 One early com-
mentator foresaw this problem, noting the predication of the statutory
scheme on the "assumption that the Department of Natural Resources Wa-
ter Management Section has sufficient staffing to process applications
promptly. In fact, the Section is undermanned and underfunded and back-
logged. Applications under the statute will necessarily be last on the list.'
' 5
'
This deficiency worsened as fiscal cuts in the mid-1990's reduced ADNR
budget and re-configured the department, subsuming the Division of Water
Resources into the Division of Mining, Land & Water Resources.
52
E. Lack ofAgency/Political Support and The "Blue Lake" Reservations
Despite statutory weaknesses, scientific challenges, and budgetary con-
straints, ADNR reserved water instream when the Alaska political envi-
ronment demanded it. In 1992, ADNR quickly adjudicated two instream
reservations at the request of the City and Borough of Sitka. Both were
state-held reservations necessary to complete a consumptive water rights
application to export large quantities of water from the Blue Lake Water-
shed.153 Earlier that same year, the legislature amended the Water Use Act
again, adding section 46.15.037-a provision authorizing large quantity,
out-of-basin water export. 54 Legislative instream advocates, while failing
to defeat the bill, were nevertheless able to attach a provision mandating a
minimum reservation of water for fish and wildlife if the water body was
"fish bearing."'' 55 Therefore, in order to export water from Blue Lake, a
reservation of water for the protection of fish was necessary for both Blue
Lake and it's tributary, Sawmill Creek.
At the time, some Alaska politicians and businessmen believed large
scale water export to Asia and the contiguous states could be the next natu-
ral resource boom. 156 The strong political and economic will behind the
export appropriation, therefore, played a large role in the prompt adjudica-
tion process of all the necessary water rights and permits, including the
property rights), the more uncertain some change in regulation or statute-perhaps to adjudicate prefer-
entially by need-may cause them to lose their "place in line." Second, the adjudication backlog is top-
heavy with instream applications. Budget constraints have created a backlog of consumptive applica-
tions as well. If forced to choose which to complete, ADNR adjudications of more traditional consump-
tive rights will most likely be given priority over instream applications.
150. Steme, supra n. 7 at 216.
15 1. White, supra n. 82, at 8. This commentator incorrectly predicted staff and funding increases
would solve the problem.
152. This combination-mining and water-adds a conflict of interest element between the two
formerly separate agencies' directives. The order, "Mining, Land & Water," may also explain much
about Alaska politics.
153. Alaska Stat §§ 46.15.035, 46.15.037 (LEXIS 2001); Estes, supra n. 84, at6.
154. Alaska Stat. § 46.15.037.
155. Interview with Christopher Estes, supra n. 119.
156. Estes, supra n. 84, at 6.
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instream reservations. 57 The reservations under section 45.15.037 of the
Alaska Water Code were adjudicated in less than a year by ADNR, while a
reservation filed by ADF&G under section 46.15.145 for Sawmill Creek-
the same body of water-is still pending adjudication more than ten years
later. 158 The Blue Lake reservations show that despite the scientific or fi-
nancial difficulties, when the political environment demands it, ADNR can
adjudicate instream flow rights in a timely manner.
A temporal examination of the Alaska instream flow application history
reveals two distinct periods: a short period of ADNR's relative cooperation
and support, followed by a long period of its disinterest, or even hostility.
First, between 1987 and 1989, ADNR adjudicated and granted ten instream
rights for fish and wildlife. 159 ADNR also accepted two private applica-
tions, the TU and AFS applications, and began their adjudication. All signs
indicated that, although hampered by financial and staffing constraints,
ADNR was not adamantly opposed to granting instream rights. 60 Then in
1991, as discussed above, all processing of instream applications ceased,
except the aforementioned Blue Lake reservations. This dramatic stop-
page 61 further illustrates the lesson: section 46.15.145 of the Alaska Water
Code requires political support (and therefore ADNR's support) to func-
tion.161
VII. THE LAW DEFEATS THE MARKET: CASE STUDY CONCLUSIONS
A. Public versus Private
Alaska's experience clarifies some of the criticisms of agency-only in-
stream flow states. First, adding private funding' 63 will not solve the prob-
lem of agency budgetary constraints; agency adjudication will still at least
partially determine the ability of private parties to gain instream rights.
Second, as seen distinctly with ADNR, political susceptibility and bureau-
157. Id. The City of Sitka projected it would earn between 30-80 million dollars per year under ideal
export projections. Id.
158. Id. Ironically, after the initial rush, the Blue Lake project is still in limbo, building the neces-
sary infrastructure for exportation. Interview with Christopher Estes, supra n. 119.
159. Harle and Estes, supra n. 85 at, 9-12. The ten instream rights held by ADF&G are for the
following watersheds: Terror river, Willow creek, Rabbit creek, Little Rabbit creek, Little Survival
creek, upper Little Sustina river, Campell Creek (2 stretches), Indian river, and Cottonwood creek.
Christopher Estes, Annual SunmarY of Instream Flow Reservations and Protections in Alaska 12 (1991
Summary).
160. Id.
161. One commentator attributed this agency policy shift to the change in the political administra-
tion at the time: Walter Hickel (R) replaced Steve Cowper (D) as Governor of Alaska in 1990. Interview
with Christopher Estes, supra n. 119.
162. Recent communications point to a new period of agency cooperation in finding solutions to
both budgetary and backlog issues; perhaps a new period of cooperation in Alaska is beginning. Tele-
phone Interview with Christopher Estes, ADF&G (November I1, 2002); Memoranda of Understanding
between ADNR and ADF&G Regarding Instream Issues, (June and October 2002) (copies on file with
the author).
163. See supra discussion in sections II(B)-(C).
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cratic baggage prevalent in agency-only systems also are not solved by pri-
vate involvement; political support of the adjudicating agency is still neces-
sary.
Alaska's experience also highlights some possible misconceptions in the
case for supplementation of public instream rights by market based private
rights. First, an effective market cannot be achieved without eliminating the
other problems-uncertainty of title, uncertainty of science, constraint on
transfer-as well as the constraint on ownership. 164 Private interest and
funding will not and cannot flow to market through "invisible hands" with
such disincentives. 165 Second, two major benefits of privately held rights-
private enforcement authority and private property autonomy-are only
important if and when those rights are challenged; the benefits are therefore
predicated on the assumption that the state agency grants the water right,
establishing it as a property right. In early policy or state planning conflicts,
where the very idea of private instream flow rights is challenged and estab-
lishment itself is the barrier, the enforcement and autonomy benefits cannot
be realized.
B. Lessons for Instream Protection Advocates and Market Advocates Alike
Alaska's problems support the conclusion that, if the goal is the protec-
tion of water instream, a system in which both the state and private organi-
zations depend on defeasible water rights alone is a less efficient means of
protection than an instream appropriation system built upon a foundational
minimum or automatic regulatory reservation from appropriation. An
automatic or minimum flow reservation 66 is important because it creates a
164. As noted earlier, transfers of instream rights are not permitted in Alaska. See supra n. 146. For
a transfer market to function, this regulatory bar must be removed; however in Alaska the regulation is
presently less of an impediment to private rights than in other states because of the plethora of unappro-
priated water. Even without the regulation ban, any instream transfers in prior appropriation states are
subject to the "no injury" rule. It does not follow, however, that private instream markets cannot occur
primarily through transfers. A diversionary right transferred to an instream right remains the same right:
that is, it presents no more of a threat to current rights than did the original owner. In fact, since the
water will be left instream, other appropriators are arguably better off and the "no injury" rule should
have less effect than a transfer between two diversionary users. There is some caselaw to support this
logical inference. In Arizona, the only other state to permit the appropriation of private instream rights
and grant one, the injury claims of other appropriators were dismissed in the case granting the private
instream right, because "since there was no actual, physical diversion or storage nor a substantial con-
sumptive use of public waters, no conflict would occur." Lori Potter, The Public's Role in the Acquisi-
tion and Enforcement of Instream Flows, 23 Land and Water L. Rev. 419, 432 (1988) (citing Arizona
Nature Conservancy, No. 33-78421 (Dept. of Water Resources April 29, 1983) (Decision and Order at
8). This case was a new appropriation. however, not a transfer. The Ramsey Creek case and Arizona's
private instream right history is discussed infra n. 174.
165. Sterne, supra n. 7, at 203.
166. Water law experts generally define a minimum or base flow reservation as a specific quantity
of flow that below which later in time appropriations will not be permitted. Gillilan & Brown, supra n.
3, at 138. The downside to this type of protection is that it does not affect any rights established prior to
the reservation, a large disadvantage in most prior appropriation states where rivers were completely
appropriated long ago. Oregon's legislature, for example, first established a minimum flow reservation
law which proved ineffective; it was later replaced by a statute permitting state-held instream rights.
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baseline below which flows may not fall. 67 Because Alaska has not estab-
lished an automatic minimum instream flow except for in the case of large
water exports, 168 the inherent weaknesses in Alaska's instream appropria-
tion statute not only defeats any private opportunities at instream rights, but
also creates difficulties for Alaska's state agency entrusted with keeping
water instream for fish and wildlife, ADF&G1
69
While ADF&G has other means of instream flow protection, the problem
of ascertaining instream water rights under section 46.15.145 of the Alaska
Water Code is the greatest impediment to their instream directive. Alaska
instream advocates, realizing this problem, attempted to pass bills establish-
ing automatic, state-held reservations of flow in both 1989 and 1991.170
Both bills were defeated.17 1 Given the track record of agency instream rights
in Alaska since then, states attempting to keep water instream would do
well not to place their respective water agencies in ADF&G's position-
lacking an automatic flow reservation provision, limited to attempting to
acquire defeasible rights in the face of bureaucratic opposition. 1 72
Second, Alaska provides a compelling example of the conclusion that po-
litical opposition remains the biggest obstacle to protecting instream flows
through private instream flow rights. 73 Institutional agency problems exac-
erbate these political tensions: ADNR must consider comparatively new
and different issues, weighing instream use versus diversionary use, in the
framework of a pre-existing system. ADNR's inability (or lack of will) to
integrate and adapt manifests itself in bureaucratic foot-dragging. The anti-
dote to this apathy is public education, interagency cooperation, and private
party-agency cooperation. Public education can increase awareness and
political popularity for private instream rights. It can also lead to a more
active role for private organizations, 'which can then take the initiative in
lobbying for instream rights where agencies will not. Interagency coopera-
tion will help bridge agency animosity and institutional aversion to change.
Neuman & Chapman, supra n. 21, at 137. In Alaska however, less than 1% of the water is appropriated;
a minimum flow established with a present priority date would be much more effective than elsewhere.
167. Another downside of a minimum flow reservation is of course that it is a regulation not a
property right and therefore susceptible to state regulatory review. See supra n. 67 and accompanying
text.
168. For discussion on the water export amendment, see supra discussion section V(E)..
169. The Alaska Fish and Game Act requires ADF&G to "manage, protect, maintain, improve, and
extend the fish, game and aquatic plant resources of the state in the interest of the economy and general
well-being of the state." Alaska Stat. § 16.05.020 (LEXIS 2002). The Act also enables the ADF&G to
acquire water rights to further its objectives or purposes. Alaska Stat. § 16.05.050(2) (LEXIS 2002).
170. Harle and Estes, supra n. 85, at 9-9, 9-1l; Anderson, supra n. 85, at 259.
17 1. Harle and Estes, supra n. 85, at 9-9.
172. The lack of an automatic minimum flow reservation for fish and wildlife in Alaska is especially
frustrating given the constitutional language seemingly mandating one. See supra n. 100 and accompa-
nying text.
173. Alaska does not seem to be alone in this regard, nor is the author the first to reach this conclu-
sion about instream flows in prior appropriation states. See Neuman, supra n. 2, at 349 (specifically
discussing Oregon); A. Dan Tarlock, supra n. 27, at 778; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Per-
spectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 671 (1993).
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When coupled with public support, both the applicant agency (ADF&G)
and the adjudicating agency (ADNR) can achieve their directives. Private
party-agency cooperation can also overcome the initial private application
barriers of scientific know-how, while mitigating the agency's own funding
limitation. The TNC-ADF&G partnership on TNC's recent application is a
good example.
Finally, Alaska's experience plainly illustrates that unless instream flow
rights are integrated into a water appropriation system, they will be unable
to create a viable market and/or provide effective instream flow protection.
Full integration must mean making effort to create an equal instream right.
To that end, review provisions and transfer rules must be required of all
rights-consumptive or instream-or not at all.
C. Conclusion
The viability of private instream rights has failed or at least stalled in
Alaska. However, Alaska's problems should not squelch the idea of private
instream flows. Rather, they illustrate a problematic application. Legal con-
straints and practical barricades will defeat a market even if private parties
are permitted to hold instream rights. This conclusion is buttressed by an
examination of one of the few other prior appropriation states to experiment
with private instream rights: Arizona. Arizona's experience proves Alaska
is not alone in its mistakes.
74
Instream rights-private or agency held-if adopted as part of a state's
water appropriation system, must be equal to consumptive rights. If ham-
pered by statutory and practical inequalities, their advantages never materi-
alize. The more hurdles and inequalities in an instream statute, the less the
statute will be used. This leads to fewer instream rights being created, and
leads away from possible solutions to instream flow issues. Private instream
water rights, for market advocates and conservationists alike, are not yet a
reality, because so far, a law has not been "framed that will do that job."' 7 5
174. Arizona is the only other state to permit private instream flow appropriation. See infra n. 23.
After a 1976 judicial opinion interpreted instream "beneficial use" to permit instream appropriation, the
Arizona Department of Water Resources (ADWR) approved an application from TNC to appropriate
water instream on Ramsey Creek for recreation and wildlife purposes. TNC needed 7 years (1983-1990)
to "prove up" the application to support their beneficial use claim due to the high informational burden.
ADWR issued a certificate of water right in 1990; it was the first instream right issued in Arizona.
TNC's instream right remains the only private instream right in Arizona. Dishlip, supra n. 142, at 10-9;
Sterne, supra n. 7, at 227. The Arizona limitations are similar to those in Alaska: a high informational
burden (5 years of data), a constraint on ownership not placed on consumptive rights (appurtenance to
land), and a statutory hierarchy effectively making instream rights second class (in times of conflict the
beneficial use of fish and wildlife can be superceded by domestic and municipal use, irrigation and stock
watering, and power and mining uses). Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45.157A-B (West 2001); Telephone
interview with Robert Wigington, Western Water and Land Attorney, TNC (November 15, 2002).
175. Trelease, supra n. 1, at 1.
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